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Code of Civil Procedure § 1218 (amended); Family Code § 6380
(amended); Penal Code § 136.2 (amended).
SB 720 (Kuehl); 2005 STAT. Ch. 631.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, domestic violence resulted in 182 deaths in California.' Each year,
nearly six percent of Californian women are physically injured as a result of
domestic violence Californians first received the right to obtain domestic
violence protective orders in 1977.3 In the years following 1977, there was a
considerable amount of legislative action designed to protect the victims of
domestic violence." In 2003, Attorney General Bill Lockyer assembled a task
force to investigate the effectiveness of the techniques the Legislature enacted
over those years.'
Based on recommendations from the task force,6 Chapter 631 creates uniform
treatment of criminal and civil protective orders and empowers city and district
attorneys to initiate contempt proceedings against violators of those orders.7 By
broadening existing powers and responsibilities, Chapter 631 aims to empower
law enforcement with the ability to protect victims of domestic violence more
effectively.S
1. Cal. Att'y Gen.'s Crime & Violence Prevention Ctr., Domestic Violence Facts, http://safestate.
org/index.cfm?navlD=42 (last visited Sept. 16, 2005) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
2. Id.
3. See Cal. Att'y Gen.'s Crime & Violence Prevention Ctr., Fighting Domestic Violence: The California
Record-Highlights, http://safestate.org/index.cfm?navid=221 (last visited Sept. 16, 2005) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (referring to the enactment of AB 1019, which granted courts the authority to issue
temporary restraining orders in domestic violence cases).
4. Id.
5. Cal. Att'y Gen.'s Crime & Violence Prevention Ctr., Attorney General's Task Force on Local
Criminal Justice Response to Domestic Violence, http://safestate.org/index.cfm?navlD=386 (last visited Sept.
16, 2005) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
6. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 720, at I (May 18, 2005).
7. Id at 5.
8. Id at 3.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Under California law, both civil9 and criminal' ° courts can issue orders
protecting people from the abusive behavior of, or any contact with, another
person." Violations of these orders are punishable by fines, imprisonment, or
both.'2 Still, violators are not always arrested 3 or prosecuted,' 4 leaving victims
unprotected because the orders are not enforced.
Some advocates have suggested that victims may initiate contempt
proceedings to seek enforcement.'5 Existing penalties for contempt include fines,
community service, and imprisonment. 6 A finding of contempt also allows the
court to order the guilty party to pay the attorneys' fees associated with the
contempt action. '
7
However, victims of domestic violence are unlikely to have the financial
resources to hire counsel and initiate contempt proceedings. In addition, private
initiation of contempt proceedings may be unconstitutional.'9 The United States
Supreme Court held that an interested party may not prosecute criminal contempt
charges. 20 Although that holding was based on a case involving copyright
9. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6218 (West 2004) (defining protective orders as those granted under sections
6320, 6321, and 6322).
10. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 136.2(a) (West Supp. 2005) (referencing a criminal court's ability to issue
court orders under section 6320 of the California Family Code).
11. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6320 (specifying "molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening,
sexually assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, annoying telephone calls as
described in Section 653m of the Penal Code, destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or
indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other
party,...").
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.6.
13. See Attorney General's Task Force on Criminal Justice Response to Domestic Violence: Regional
Hearing-San Diego, California, 26 (2004) [hereinafter San Diego Hearing] (statement of Steve Allen, Dir. of
Legal Services, Ctr. for Cmty. Solutions) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that officers do not
have sufficient training to know when arrest is a possibility or requirement).
14. See Attorney General's Task Force on Criminal Justice Response to Domestic Violence: Regional
Hearing-Fresno, California, 74 (2004) [hereinafter Fresno Hearing] (statement of John Zrofsky, Police Chief,
Shafter Police Dep't) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that it is the policy of the Kern County
District Attorney's Office not to prosecute the violation of misdemeanor restraining order violations without
evidence of physical harm).
15. See id. at 170 (statement of Jan Sublett, Executive Dir., Alliance Against Family Violence & Sexual
Assault) (stating that when prosecutors fail to file criminal charges, victims are told they need to file civil
contempt charges).
16. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1218(c) (West 2004).
17. Id. § 1218(a).
18. See Fresno Hearing, supra note 14, at 170 (statement of Jan Sublett, Executive Dir., Alliance
Against Family Violence & Sexual Assault) (stating that victims are unable to afford counsel to take action in
filing civil contempt actions).
19. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 802-09 (1987) (holding that
federal charges of criminal contempt require prosecution by a disinterested party).
20. Id. at 809.
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infringement,2' the ruling may mean that a domestic violence victim would not be
able to file for contempt on a protective order that a criminal court issued."
Existing law requires that courts or their designees enter criminal protective
orders into the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System
(CLETS).23 CLETS allows police officers to access information from the scenes
of crimes. Although existing law also requires that courts issue civil orders on
the forms allowing them to be entered into CLETS,25 they are not required to
enter the civil orders into the system. This has led to a lack of protection for
victims. 26 In many counties, the victim is responsible for filing the paperwork to
have the order entered into CLETS.27 In addition, officers have stated that they
cannot enforce an order if a victim does not have a copy of it because they do not
28have access to the information .
III. CHAPTER 631
Chapter 631 creates three distinct changes to the current enforcement of
domestic violence protective orders. First, it allows district and city attorneys to
initiate charges for contempt when a party violates a domestic violence protective
order.29 Second, it requires that civil protective orders be entered into CLETS in
the same manner as criminal protective orders. 30 Lastly, it clarifies the power of
criminal courts to issue protective orders prohibiting any contact between the
parties.3'
21. Id.at789-90.
22. See Fact Sheet, Shelia James Kuehl, SB 720 Fact Sheet, available at http://democrats.sen.ca.govl
articlefiles/2592-SB%20720%2OKuehl%2OFact%2OSheet.pdf (last visited Jun. 23, 2006) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (applying Young v. United States to this situation).
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 136.2(g) (West Supp. 2005).
24. CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 15151 (West 2004).
25. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6221(c) (West 2004).
26. See Attorney General's Task Force on Criminal Justice Response to Domestic Violence: Regional
Hearing-Redding, California, 139-140 (2004) [hereinafter Redding Hearing] (statement of Dennis Kessinger,
Legal Assistance Coordinator, Shasta County Women's Refuge) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(stating that a temporary restraining order lasts only until the time of the hearing and that in the gap between the
hearing and the filing of the paperwork for any new orders, victims are vulnerable).
27. See Attorney General's Task Force on Criminal Justice Response to Domestic Violence: Regional
Hearing-Sacramento, California, 171 (2004) [hereinafter Sacramento Hearing] (statement of Leslie Brown,
Sacramento County Sheriff's Dep't) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that victims of domestic
violence are responsible for completing the paperwork although they are "the least likely person to be able to
deal with this process").
28. See Sacramento Hearing, supra note 27, at 171-72 (statement of Leslie Brown, Sacramento County
Sheriffs Dep't) (stating that although orders can be confirmed by checking CLETS, officers have a preference
to see the physical copy and will sometimes not enforce orders without one).
29. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1218(d) (amended by Chapter 631).
30. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6380(g) (amended by Chapter 631).
31. CAL. PENAL CODE § 136.2(g)(1) (amended by Chapter 631).
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Previously, although a party who violated a protective order could be held in
contempt, it was unclear who was responsible for initiating the action.32 Chapter
631 does not specify which party must initiate it, but does grant prosecutors the
power to do So3 Because a finding of contempt allows for the award of
attorneys' fees, the Senate Judiciary Committee questioned whether it would be
appropriate for the prosecutors' offices to collect the fees and thus suggested that
any fees collected be directed to a special fund.34 Chapter 631 thus directs the
payment of all attorneys' fees collected under this power to the Office of
Emergency Services for funding domestic violence shelters.35
Another problem the Attorney General's task force revealed was the inability
to enforce civil domestic violence protective orders because they were not
required to be reported in CLETS in the same way as criminal orders.36 Chapter
631 requires that both types of orders be entered into the reporting system
identically,37 adopting the practice that is already in place in nineteen California
counties.38
Chapter 631 also allows criminal courts to issue so-called "stay-away orders"
that prohibit all contact between parties.39 This change allows criminal courts to
prohibit contact in the same manner as civil courts and removes the criminal
statutory limitation that orders be issued to prohibit contact "intended to harass,
intimidate, annoy or threaten a victim or witness."
IV. ANALYSIS
Chapter 631 was uncontroversial.' It was proposed based on suggestions
gleaned from two years of hearings, investigations, and analysis. 42 The supporters,
including law enforcement, victims' advocacy groups, and prosecutors,43 all hope the
changes to the existing law will make a more uniform statewide system of protection
for victims of domestic violence. 44
32. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMT'IEE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 720, at 5 (May 18, 2005).
33. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1218(d) (amended by Chapter 631).
34. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 720, at 6 (May 18, 2005).
35. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1218(d) (amended by Chapter 631).
36. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 720, at 4-5 (Apr. 5, 2005).
37. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6380(g) (amended by Chapter 631).
38. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITrEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 720, at 5 (Apr. 5, 2005).
39. CAL. PENAL CODE § 136.2(g)(1) (amended by Chapter 631).
40. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 720, at 6 (Apr. 5, 2005).
41. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 720, at 1 (June 7, 2005).
42. See id. at 3 (stating that the bill was based on the recommendations from the Attorney General's
Task Force after two years of study).
43. Id. at 5-6.
44. See Kuehl, supra note 22 (stating that the purpose of the bill is to "enhance the safety of victims of
intimate partner violence").
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The problem those testifying before the Task Force cited most frequently was
the lack of resources.45 All of the remedies Chapter 631 creates require the courts
and prosecutors to invest more time and effort. 46 Although the Legislature keyed
Chapter 631 as non-fiscal, 7 the demands it places on court systems and
prosecutors may stretch the already thin resources, both human and financial, too
far. 
48
Additionally, Chapter 631 does not require prosecutors to file contempt
charges against violators of protective orders; it simply gives them that power. 9
Prior to Chapter 631, people blamed the failure to prosecute misdemeanor
violations of domestic violence protective orders on a number of causes. Some
blamed prosecutors' concerns for their conviction rates,0 some theorized that it
was the inability to punish those that would be convicted due to the lack of jail
resources,5' and others thought there simply were not enough resources to
prosecute all of the cases 2 Contempt charges may offer the solution to the issue
of limited jail resources because of the ability to sentence violators to community
service. 3 However, there is no guarantee that the cases will be prosecuted if
issues of resources or concerns for conviction rates are more prevalent. Chapter
631 only grants a new tool to counties and cities that are already prosecuting
violators; it does not require increased prosecution in areas where it is lacking.
Requiring courts to enter civil orders into CLETS may strain court
resources. 4 However, at the same time, requiring court officials to do much of
the filing work-instead of victims-may relieve the strain put on the system. As
45. See Fresno Hearing, supra note 14, at 18 (statement of David Gottlieb, Fresno County Superior
Court Comm'r) (citing the biggest problem in Fresno as, "resources, resources, resources"); Attorney General's
Task Force on Criminal Justice Response to Domestic Violence: Regional Hearing-Los Angeles, California,
134 (2004) [hereinafter LA. Hearing] (statement of Laurie Taylor, Coordinator of the Domestic Violence Unit,
L.A. Police Dep't) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (saying that all cases would be given "CSI type of
attention" if only they had the resources); Redding Hearing, supra note 26, at 129 (statement of Jerry Benito,
District Attorney of Shasta County) (stating that their successful enforcement program was undercut by budget
cuts).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 29-40 (explaining Chapter 631).
47. ASSEMBLY RULES COMMITTEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 720, at 2 (June 23, 2005).
48. See Redding Hearing, supra note 26, at 155 (statement of Dennis Kessinger, Legal Assistance
Coordinator, Shasta County Women's Refuge) (discussing the difficulties inherent in the possibility of requiring
courts to enter orders into CLETS).
49. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1218(d) (amended by Chapter 631).
50. See Fresno Hearing, supra note 14, at 172 (statement of Jan Sublett, Executive Dir., Alliance
Against Family Violence & Sexual Assault) (responding that although the reason given is "lack of resources,"
she attributes the failure to prosecute to concern for "winnable cases").
51. See LA. Hearing, supra note 45, at 20-21 (statement of Alana Bowman, Deputy City Att'y, Los
Angeles City Att'y's Office) (discussing the "inability to obtain jail space" for misdemeanors in general).
52. See Fresno Hearing, supra note 14, at 154 (statement of Mike Agnew, Detective, Fresno Police
Dep't) ("[Tlhere is not staffing, courtrooms, [or] judges to prosecute that number of misdemeanor cases.").
53. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1218(c).
54. See Redding Hearing, supra note 26, at 155 (statement of Dennis Kessinger, Legal Assistance
Coordinator, Shasta County Women's Refuge) (discussing the difficulties inherent in the possibility of requiring
courts to enter orders into CLETS).
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Leslie Brown of the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department proposed, after the
victim tells the story of the abuse, "the court and the system need to kick in to
accomplish the rest of the task: filing, notification of approval or denial requests,
service, distribution of service and entering in CLETS. Everything needs to be
accomplished by the courts-not that person having trouble just getting through
the day."55 By moving the burden from the victim to the court to transmit the
information to the Department of Justice for entry into CLETS, Chapter 631 is
offering better care and protection to the victims of domestic violence.56 Because
this aspect of Chapter 631 is a requirement, it will hopefully solve the immediate
problem of police officers' access to domestic violence protective orders from
civil courts even if it creates new ones by straining the court system.
V. CONCLUSION
Prior to Chapter 631, Jan Sublett of the Alliance Against Family Violence
and Sexual Assault described the system as living up to an abuser's threats to a
victim:17 "[T]hat's exactly what their perpetrators tells them. [']Nothing's going
to happen,['] and then nothing does happen."58 Chapter 631 was designed to
make something happen. Although the roadblocks of limited resources and
budget cuts may derail some of its effectiveness,59 Chapter 631 provides victims
with additional support and protection 6° and provides prosecutors with additional
options for punishing violators.6'
55. Sacramento Hearing, supra note 27, at 171 (statement of Leslie Brown, Sacramento County
Sheriff's Dep't).
56. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6380(a) (amended by Chapter 631).
57. Fresno Hearing, supra note 14, at 171 (statement of Jan Sublett, Executive Dir., Alliance Against
Family Violence & Sexual Assault).
58. Id.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
